usually highly dubious, making the choices of practitioners ''like kids in a candy store'' more understandable. The distressing cognitive dissonance now is that the science has advanced dramatically over the last 50 years, and there are now numerous state-of-the-science-based and empirically supported choices for assessment and for treatment, yet practitioners too often still choose to do whatever they feel like, as Meehl described, regardless of evidence.
In my own career, I struggled with these issues beginning in the 1960s. During many of my 20 years at Stanford University, Albert Bandura and I tried to hold on to a science-based clinical training program. The bizarre situation we faced there is of more than personal and historical interest: I suspect that many of the same conflicts still exist and motivate the efforts described by Baker and colleagues. Bandura and I, and our students and other colleagues, were discovering the remarkable discrepancies between what the scientific work was revealing and the requirements imposed by the pressures for maintaining accreditation. The professional accreditation requirements insisted on continuing practices whose value was contradicted by the empirical findings. Those requirements not only flew in the face of the data but also made enormous demands on faculty and student time in the clinical program. At one point, Bandura made a table of faculty arrivals and departures in our clinical program. It showed rapid, continuous turnover among the junior faculty in clinical, because those who devoted their time to clinical work and were good at it generally did not meet the academic standards, and vice versa, so accepting a clinical position at Stanford almost guaranteed no future in the university. For a temporary solution, we turned the clinical program into one on experimental psychopathology. It included more experimental work and research, most of it within clinical settings and directly relevant to clinical applications. In it we also could move away from techniques that neither of us believed in, given the data, and that both of us were trying to change-from costly tests with little or no validity to therapies without evidence of efficacy but on which the American Psychological Association insisted for clinical programs and for acceptable internship experiences. It became a program that helped train many of the people who became leaders in the development of cognitive behavior modification and assessment. And as the pressures grew, it became impossible to maintain.
Baker, McFall, and Shoham make a compelling case for what many of us have long believed: A realistic route for change requires a new accreditation system that demands high-quality science training and insists on it as part of the core for doctoral training in clinical psychology. The good news-the first in a very long time on this topic-is that such a system is here in the new Psychological Clinical Science Accreditation System (PCSAS). Its mission is to ''accredit clinical psychology training programs that offer high quality science-centered education and training, producing graduates who are successful in generating and applying scientific knowledge'' (p. ii). It is a mission that deserves the strongest support.
Support for the movement toward a scientifically principled clinical psychology has self-evident potential benefits to the public, to the profession, and to our science. It's also worth remembering that many of our best students still enter psychology to become clinical psychologists. They deserve the opportunity to do such work informed and guided by evidence, trained to evaluate it properly, and able to add to it themselves.
